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T

he comparable worth theory
has emerged as one of the most
controversial subjects in the
area of employment rights in this
decade. This article will focus upon the
developing concept of comparable
worth in sex-based wage discrimination
cases under Title VII of the Equal Rights
Act of 1964. 1 Statistics indicate that in
the last twenty years there has been an
unprecedented gain in the number of
women in the workforce. 2 However,
despite anti-discriminatory regulation in
payment of wages, the ratio of women's
to men's median earnings has remained
relatively unchanged since 1939. 3 At
every level of educational achievement,
women's median earnings continue to
lag far behind men's earnings. "On [the]
average, whether college graduates or
high school dropouts, women earned
about 60 cents for every dollar their
male counterparts were paid" in 1981. 4
Despite some inroads into male
dominated fields,s the disparity in wages
is largely attributable to the fact that the
majority of women remain concentrated
in "traditionally" female 6 and lower
paying occupations. 7

Sex-Based Wage Discrimination
and The Comparable Worth Doctrine

by Claire M . Treanor

The comparable worth theory is an
attempt to redress the wage disparity
that exists as a result of sex segregation in
the workplace. This comparable worth
doctrine has been defined as a
"controversial concept under which a
plaintiff might claim increased
compensation on the basis of a
comparison of the intrinsic worth or
difficulty of their job with that of other
jobs in the same organization or
community. "8
Wage discrimination cases can be
brought under either Title VII or the
Equal Pay Act. 9 In order to analyze
comparable worth under Title VII, it is
necessary to understand the relationship
between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
and how they separately address wage
discrimination.

Equal Pay Act
Enacted in 1963, the Equal Pay Act
sought to provide legal remedies for
victims of gender-based wage
discrimination. The Act represented the
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first step in acknowledging the growing
pattern of women permanently in the
workforce and the move to eliminate
past paternalistic attitudes toward
women.1O Intended as a "broad charter
of women's rights in the economic
field,"11 the Act is limited in scope to
addressing wage discrimination. The
well-known phrase "equal pay for equal
work" is the thrust of the Act. However,
it is well settled that the jobs to be
compared need not be identical in all
respects before the Equal Pay Act is
applicableY "Equal work" has been
judicially defined to ~ean that the jobs
must be substantially similar.13
In order to prove that a violation of
the Act has occurred, the employee
must show that "her salary was lower
than that paid by the employer to
employees of the opposite sex .. .for
equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort and
responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions."14
Minor differences in the degrees of skill,
effort or responsibility required for the
performance of the job will not render
the equal pay standard inapplicable. IS
Application of this test necessarily
requires a case-by-case analysis of the
factual issues involved. The
requirements of equal skill, effort and
responsibility have been defined
broadly enough to allow proof of any
characteristic which makes one job
harder than or qualitatively different
from another. Skill includes such
variables as the experience, training,
education, and ability required for the
job. 16 Effort includes mental or physical
exertion. 17 Responsibility includes the
degree of accountability and other
matters which might reflect on the
employee's importance or authority.18
The Act specifically allows employers
to maintain different wages for men and
women in substantially equal jobs if
payment is based on: (1) a seniority
system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system
that measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (4) a
differential based on a factor other than
sex. Thus, a prima facie showing of
unequal pay for equal work may be
rebutted by the employer proving that
the payment of different wages is based
on one of the affirmative defenses
enumerated above.
In keeping with the narrow scope of
the Act, it is generally accepted that if
the jobs being compared are not equal in
content it is unnecessary to compare
their skill, effort or responsibility. 19
Specifically, the legislative history of the
Equal Pay Act makes it clear that there is
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to be no comparison of the skill, effort
or responsibility of different jobs. In
fact, a 1962 draft of the equal pay bill
called for "equal pay for comparable
work." The word "equal," however,
was substituted for "comparable" so as
to reduce the amount of latitude the
word "comparable" allowed. 20
While the Equal Pay Act took the first
step in addressing wage disparities
between men and womenr it does not
offer relief in any circumstance except
where the employer also employs a male
to perform substantially equal work.
The Equal Pay Act does not address "the
problem of job segregation, and
therefore does not provide a remedy for
those women who are trapped in low
paying, largely sex-segregated jobs."21

At every level of
educational
achievement,
women's median
earnings continue to
lag far behind
men's earnings.

Title VII
In further recognition of the problems
facing minorities in employment,
Congress passed Title VII of the Equal
Rights Act of 1964. 22 It is interesting to
note that at the time, the inclusion of sex
in Title VII as a prohibited basis of
discrimination was offered as a House
floor amendment, without prior
hearings or investigations, for the
purpose of gaining opposition to Title
VII and thus insuring its demise.
Title VII encompasses a much
broader range of discriminatory
practices in employment. The central
focus of these cases is whether an
employer is treating some people less
favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. 23
Specifically as to wages, under Section
703 (a)(l) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it is an unlawful employment
practice for an employer "to
discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such
individual's ... sex .... "24
Two distinct methods of establishing
discrimination under Title VII are
disparate treatment and disparate
impact. The differences between
disparate treatment cases and disparate
impact cases set forth by the court in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States,2S are as follows:
'Disparate treatment' .. .is the most
easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer
simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or
national Origm. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations
be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment (citation
omitted). Undoubtedly disparate
treatment was the most obvious
evil Congress had in mind when it
enacted Title VII.... Claims of
disparate treatment may be
distinguished from claims that
stress 'disparate impact.' The
latter involve employment
practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business
necessity (citation omitted). Proof
of discriminatory motive, we have
held, is not required under a
disparate impact theory.
The disparate impact doctrine,
aimed at covert intentional
discrimination, 'was designed to
insure more perfect realization of
the beneficient purposes of Title
VII by making plain that
discriminatory consequences as
well as discriminatory intent fall
under the bank of this remedial
legislation, and by providing a
relatively easy burden of proof of
discriminatory consequences to
overcome difficulties that might
normally obtain in proving
discrimination in employment .... '26
In order for a plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under this
theory, she need only prove the
existence of "an employment policy or
practice which, though facially neutral
or even benign in actual purpose,
nevertheless imposes a substantially
disproportiona te burden upon a
claimant's protected group as compared
to a favored group within the total set of
persons to whom it is applied. "27 For

example, an employer might require that
the applicant meet certain height and
weight requirements in order to qualify
for the job. 2s Such a requirement may
effectively exclude most females while
not having the same impact on males.
An employer may overcome a
showing of disparate impact by showing
that the different treatment is justified
by a business necessity.29 Under the
business necessity defense, the employer
must show that the challenged
requirment has a manifest relationship
to the employment in question. 3o
Plaintiffs proceeding under a
disparate treatment theory must show
"proof of actions taken by the employer
from which [the court] can infer
discriminatory animus because
experience has proved that in the
absence of any other explanation, it is
more likely than not that those actions
were bottomed on impermissable [sexbased] considerations. "31 As noted
earlier, disparate treatment cases require
direct or circumstantial proof of
discriminatory motive, whereas no such
proof of motive is required in disparate
impact cases. 32
Once a plaintiff has shown a
difference in treatment, the employer
can rebut the inference of
discrimination by showing a legitimate
business reason for its action. If the
defendant responds with a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the
action, the plaintiff then has a chance to
show that the proffered reasons are
merely pretextuaP3
While Title VII is arguably broad
enough to encompass claims based on a
comparable worth theory, until 1981
such claims were not legally recognizable
due to the judicial construction of the
Bennett Amendment to Title VII.

The Bennett Amendment
The Bennett Amendment to Title VII
provides that it is not unlawful "for an
employer to differentiate upon the basis
of sex in determining the amount of
wages or compensation paid ... to
employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the
provisions of...[the Equal Pay Act]."34
The intent of the Bennett Amendment is
to reconcile conflicts between the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII and ensure that the
Equal Pay Act would not be nullified. 35
Due to the lack of significant legislative
history, courts differ on the effect of the
Bennett Amendment. Some courts
interpreted it as incorporating the equal
pay standard of the Equal Pay Act into
Title VII. As a result, a plaintiff cannot
prove a violation of Title VII unless she

can also prove that there was a violation
of the Equal Pay Act. 36
Courts later opined that the
Amendment only incorporated the four
affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay
Act into Title VIp?

Gunther: Opening the Door for
Comparable Worth?
In County of Washington v. Gunther,3s
the Supreme Court resolved the
uncertainty created by the Bennett
Amendment. Respondents in Gunther,
female prison guards in the female
section of the Washington County
Prison, alleged that wage disparity
between male and female guards was the
result of intentional sex discrimination.

The primary problem
with the
comparable worth
theory lies in
defining the ttvalue"
to assign to the
work performed.

The county had conducted a market
survey which showed that the female
guards should have been paid 95% of
the wages of male guards based on their
worth to the employer. Subsequent to
the study, the county implemented the
recommended wages for male guards
but only paid female guards 70% of the
wages paid to the male guards. 39
Respondents asserted that they did
not have to meet the equal work
standards of the Equal Pay Act because
the Bennett Amendment should only
incorporate the four affirmative
defenses of the Act. The Court agreed,
holding that the Amendment does not
restrict Title VII cases to the equal pay
for equal work standards. 40
The Court concluded that the
plaintiffs were seeking to show by direct
evidence that they were victims of
intentional discrimination and
accordingly held that the plaintiffs
should be permitted to proceed under
the disparate treatment theory of Title

VII. The Court recognized that its
decision could be viewed as support for
comparable worth claims, but
specifically declined to reach the issue of
that doctrine's viability under Title VII,
stating that "respondents' claim is not
based on the controversial concept of
comparable worth."41 Thus, the debate
continues; the Court appears to have
broadened the contours of prohibitory
sex-based wage discrimination under
Title VII but has not yet identified its
boundaries.

The Post,Gunther Debate
The Supreme Court seems to have
opened the door to comparable worth
claims under Title VII, but it is unclear
whether that extends beyond cases in
which plaintiffs can prove intentional
discrimination. Without a clear
mandate on the validity of comparable
worth, lower courts continue to struggle
with the precise parameters of a Title VII
wage discrimination case.
The court in Spaulding v. University of
Washington,42 stated that Gunther's
"recognition of intentional
discrimination may well signal the outer
limit of legal theories cognizable under
Title VII. This conclusion is supported
by considerations of precedent,
prudence and judicial competence. "43
Appellants in Spaulding, members of
the faculty of the University of
Washington School of Nursing, alleged
that the University engaged in
discriminatory compensation practices
against them in comparison to male
faculty members in other academic
disciplines. In holding that the
appellants failed to establish a prima
facie case under the disparate treatment
theory, the court stated that "evidence
of comparable work, although not
necessarily irrelevant in proving
discrimination under some alternative
theory, will not alone be sufficient to
establish a prima facie case. "44 The court
rejected the appellants' suggestion- that
Gunther provided for a "comparability
plus" test, requiring only some degree of
job comparability plus some
combination of factors including direct
and circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory conduct and pay
disparities. The court stated that
"[s]uch an unwieldy test might allow
plaintiffs to bolster inadequate showings
of comparability with a confusing
potpourri of 'plus factors,' plunging
courts into standardless supervision of
employer / employee relations. "45
Similarly, in Power v. Barry County,
Michigan,46 the court held that in the
absence of an allegation of intentional
Spring, 19851The Law Forum-5

discrimination on the part of the
employer to depress the wages of female
prison matrons, a claim for comparable
worth was not a viable independent legal
theory under Title VII. The court stated
that it "cannot and will not, evaluate
different jobs and determine their worth
to an employer or to society and then,
on that basis alone, determine whether
Title VII has been violated ... ".47
The Power court noted that there are
"inherent problems and other
ramifications in making such a
subj ective evaluation of the intrinsic
worth of different jobs ... ".48
The primary problem with the
comparable worth theory lies in defining
the "value" to assign to the work
perfomed. 49 Opponents of the theory
believe that to take the value of a job out
of the market where it is regulated by
supply and demand and assign a value
based on mathematical calculations will
reek havoc on the economy. 50
Comparable worth has even been
analogized to Marx's socialist concepts
of labor where all jobs are politically
defined, mathematically related,
measured values. 51
Of course it is not surprising that the
primary opponents to the theory are
businessmen. While businessmen will
argue that they base their compensation
plans on market determinants, job
evaluation studies are employed in
business, industry and government. 52
One such job evaluation study led to a
court upholding a claim based on the
comparable worth theory. The court in
AFSCME v. State of Wash. 53 addressed a
comparable worth claim in which the
State of Washington had commissioned
a comprehensive study of all
government positions, comparing the
pay differences between predominantly
male and predominantly female
positions. The study, conducted in
1974, found 59 predominantly male
classifications and 62 predominantly
female classifications. 54
The methodology used to value each
employment classification was based on
four factors: knowledge and skills,
mental demands, accountability, and
working conditions. The study revealed
that the predominantly female
classifications were compensated with
an average salary of 20% less than
predominantly male classifications of
similar complexity and value. 55
The conclusions of the study were
affirmed by two governors, by a
resolution of one of the two state
personnel boards, and by amendment to
the state's compensation statutes.
However, although the study was
6-Tht' La\\' Forum SjJring, 1985

completed in 1974, no appropnatIon
was passed to implement the
comparable worth salary system
developed pursuant to the study until
after the AFSCME suit was filed in
1983. Even then, the plan adopted was
described by the court as providing
"nothing more than a token
appropriation of $1.5 million ... and a
ten-year remedial" plan. 56
The AFSCME court found that the
state's failure to pay the plaintiffs their
evaluated worth in accordance with the
comparable worth study constituted
discrimination in violation of Title VII
under both the disparate treatment and
disparate impact doctrines. 57
Specifically, the court found that the
state's system of compensation, while
facially neutral, had a disparate impact
upon employees in predominantly
female job classifications. The state
failed to demonstrate a legitimate and
overriding business consider a tion
justifying the policy. 58 In addition, the
court found that the state's
implementation and perpetuation of its
system of compensation was intentional
and resulted in unfavorable treatment of
employees in predominantly female
classifications. The discriminatory
intent required by the disparate
treatment theory was evidenced by the
"deliberate perpetuation of an
approximately 20% disparity in salaries
between predominantly male and
predominantly female job classifications
with the same number of job evaluation
points. "59
Although the court stated at the
beginning of its decision that AFSCME
"is more accurately characterized [as] a
straightforward 'failure to pay' case,"60
than a comparable worth case, it
represents the first reported decision in
which liability has been imposed under
Title VII for sex discrimination in
compensation involving dissimilar jobs.
AFSCME is also the first case in which
a court has applied the disparate impact
analysis to a compensation system. It is
doubtful, however, whether
jurisdictions that have rejected disparate
impact analysis where an employer's
subjective decision making is involved
would consider it applicable to
compensation systems based on job
evaluation studies. 62
The question of whether other courts
will be persuaded by the AFSCME
decision to embrace comparable worth
analysis in Title VII wage discrimination
cases was answered negatively by at least
one court thus far. In Cox v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Company,63 the Court
stated that

[t]he superficially plausible
analysis in [AFSCME] (citation
omitted) is fundamentally
implausible. It is impractical and
violative of market conditions to
attempt to correct all disparity
between the pay for so called
"women's jobs" and the pay for so
called "men's jobs" by stretching
the Equal Pay Act or Title VII
beyond their langauge. The correct
remedy is to make sure that all jobs
are open to both sexes. 64
The Cox court's opinion patterns the
general reluctance of the courts to
become involved in the subjective
decision making process of evaluating
dissimilar jobs based on their intrinsic
value to the employer.

Conclusion
The civil rights of women in the area
of employment-based wage discrimination are still unfolding. Business and
governmental entities have conducted
numerous job evaluation studies to
determine the pay disparity between
predominantly female and predominantly male positions. It is anticipated that
AFSCME represents only a single case in
a wave of litigation based upon failure of
an employer to implement a job
evaluation study. Whether such claims
are based upon a comparable worth
theory or a disparate treatment theory of
intentional discrimination for failure to
implement the results of the study, the
result will be the same under the
majority's current Gunther interpretation.
In the absence of a job evaluation
study, I believe that the courts will
continue to be reluctant, without
evidence of intentional discrimination,
to intervene in subjective market
determinations made by employers in
setting wages. Courts will find it
difficult, if not impossible, within the
limits of the judicial system and
litigation practices to arrive at the
essentially subjective value comparison
of differing jobs within the workforce.
The vestiges from past paternalistic
policies and pay inequities will continue
to pervade predominantly female
positions until comparable worth is
recognized as a viable independent
theory or the market adjusts itself.
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